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HALLIBURTON II: A LOSER’S
HISTORY
A.C. PRITCHARD*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to bring
fundamental reform to securities class actions last term in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. The Court ducked that opportunity,
passing the buck to Congress to undo the mess that the Court had
created a quarter century prior in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Congress’s
history in dealing with securities class actions suggests that reform is
unlikely to come from the legislature anytime soon. The Securities
and Exchange Commission appears to be satisfied with the status quo
as well. With these institutional actors resisting reform, corporations
and their shareholders may resort to self-help in dealing with the cost
and distraction created by securities class actions. Paradoxically,
resistance to reform of securities class actions may result in self-help
measures that eliminate securities class actions—and their deterrent
value—altogether.
I. INVASIVE SPECIES? A LOSER’S PERSPECTIVE
Securities fraud class actions can be seen as a judicial invasive
species: carelessly introduced, hell on the native fauna, and almost
impossible to eradicate. Judges thoughtlessly unleashed this parasite
when they took it upon themselves to develop a remedy for fraud
infecting secondary securities markets (i.e., transactions between
investors); no statute compelled them to do it. Nothing in the relevant
statute and its implementing regulation—in this case, § 10(b) of the
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 —authorizes a
private cause of action for securities fraud. Instead, the courts, egged
on by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), invented it
out of whole cloth, ignoring more limited private causes of action
3
explicitly created by Congress. Since the private cause of action
4
under Rule 10b-5 was first discovered by the courts, the Supreme
Court has at various times expanded and contracted its scope. In
general, however, the § 10(b) private right of action has grown from
what then-Justice William Rehnquist called a “legislative acorn” into a
5
“judicial oak.”
Kudzu is more like it. This invasive species of securities fraud class
actions went from nuisance to menace—endangering shareholders of
public companies and the competitiveness of the U.S. capital
markets—when the Supreme Court handed down Basic Inc. v.
6
Levinson. In Basic, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs need not
show individual reliance on alleged corporate misrepresentations but
instead could rely on the market price having incorporated those
misstatements: the “fraud-on-the-market” (FOTM) presumption. The
FOTM presumption allows plaintiffs’ lawyers to certify a class action
for securities fraud. Class certification is a big deal: defendants
inevitably face enormous costs from litigating and settling these suits,
thus creating an enormous incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring
cases for nuisance value alone.
7
After Basic there was a huge spike in securities litigation. But
those lawsuits almost never resolved the question of whether
corporate fraud had actually occurred. Stock prices dropped, by
reason of fraud or otherwise, suits were brought, and settlements—
totaling many billions of dollars—were paid. Plaintiffs’ lawyers took
home billions in fees as their cut for acting as middlemen in effecting

1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2015).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2015).
3. Most notable here is § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, which creates an explicit
cause of action for material misstatements in SEC filings. See Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West 2015).
4. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (the initial case
finding a private cause of action).
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
6. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
7. Vincent E. O’Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991,
at A20 (reporting that the rate at which securities class actions were filed nearly tripled from the
date of the Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision in 1988 to June 1991).
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these transfers; companies paid their own lawyers similar sums for
defending them. By the mid-1990s, the parasites of the securities bar
were thriving, stunting the growth of American companies. Along with
their rise came calls for reform from corporate America.
Congress responded to the flood of cases unleashed by Basic by
tweaking the rules of securities class action in 1995, but it left the
8
fundamental framework intact. The politics of the situation—
plaintiffs’ lawyers on one side, similarly deep-pocketed corporate
defendants on the other—resulted in a wary stalemate. The political
gridlock could readily be interpreted as legislative acquiescence. The
Supreme Court tried to trim the oak it created in a series of
controversial decisions. But neither Congress nor the Court was
willing to eradicate the invasive species and replant. The number of
cases being filed did not change, and securities class actions became a
fixture in the public corporation landscape.
The Supreme Court’s recalcitrance might be excused by the fact
that it was never squarely faced with the issue of whether to overrule
Basic. That opportunity arose in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
9
Inc. —commonly known as Halliburton II. Halliburton II finally
presented the question of whether the Court should repudiate
FOTM—a potentially pivotal moment in the history of securities
fraud class actions. Overruling Basic’s FOTM presumption would
have presented an opportunity to rebuild securities fraud class actions
from the ground up on a more coherent foundation based upon an
understanding of modern securities markets. Instead of pursuing
fundamental reform, the Court tinkered around the periphery, adding
a new battle of the experts to these cases, taking them further away
from actually adjudicating the question of fraud. The Court’s
Halliburton II decision arguably makes a bad situation worse, as I
explain below. At the very least, it will make these suits more
expensive for shareholders without any discernible benefit in terms of
deterring corporate fraud. In other words, more costs with no benefits.
How did we get here?

8. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified in part at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (West 2015)). The most important change was
the PSLRA’s pleading standard, which requires that the fraud be pleaded with particularity,
including pleading facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant made the
misstatement with a fraudulent state of mind. See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551
U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard).
9. 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2014).
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The outcome in Halliburton II is personally disappointing;
incremental reform seemed within grasp. I have been advocating
generally for reform of securities class actions since beginning my
academic career more than fifteen years ago, and I advocated for a
10
particular reform in Halliburton II. That plea was rebuffed by the
Supreme Court. That response was disappointing to me as a reformer
interested in promoting deterrence and efficiency. But it is puzzling to
me as a scholar who focuses on the history of securities law in the
Supreme Court. No one thinks that the justices are stupid, but more
than a quarter century of tinkering with securities fraud class actions
by the Court has produced a regime that is impossible to defend.
Presented with an opportunity to fix securities class actions, the
Court’s response is judicial abdication: it’s not our problem, man.
Given that the principal impetus fueling securities fraud class actions
came from the Supreme Court, why won’t the Court take
responsibility for eradicating this noxious weed? Serious question:
Why won’t the justices step up and fix this mess?
In this essay, I attempt to answer that question. History is written
11
by the victors, the saying goes. But maybe the losers can offer a
useful—if inevitably critical—perspective, too. The future, after all, is
not yet written. A better historical understanding of the Supreme
Court’s development of securities class actions might offer some
guidance for that future. In Halliburton II, the Court missed an
opportunity to reduce wasteful litigation and redirect legal resources
toward deterring actual corporate fraud. The Court ducked. Why are
we left with judicial inaction while the invasive species of securities
fraud class actions continues to spread?
I believe the answer is rooted in the Court’s incremental approach
to securities fraud class actions, uninformed by empirical data on how
these lawsuits work in the real world. Meaningful reform of securities
fraud class actions must begin with reining in the grossly inflated
measure of damages that the lower courts have assumed to be
applicable in such cases. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never
shown any interest in that reform. Moreover, reforming the damages
10. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (hereinafter Brief
of Law Professors).
11. George Orwell, As I Please, TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 1944 (“A Nazi and a non-Nazi version of
the present war would have no resemblance to one another, and which of them finally gets into
the history books will be decided not by evidential methods but on the battlefield. . . . History is
written by the winners.”).
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measure would require bold initiative, something that has been
largely lacking from the Court’s securities jurisprudence since it
handed down Basic. Indeed, its incremental approach to securities
class actions has created a regime that may allow the fundamental
question of damages to be kicked down the road indefinitely. The
Court’s inertia is reinforced by the SEC, which stands in the way of
damages reform for securities fraud class actions. The Court has
repeatedly invited Congress to weigh in on securities class action
reform, but the legislature sits on the sidelines, paralyzed by classic
political gridlock. Given this sorry history, the future may see
corporations and their shareholders resorting to self-help by
eliminating the option of securities fraud class actions altogether. That
alternative would eliminate not only the wasteful wealth transfers of
securities fraud class actions, but also their deterrent value.
II. RELIANCE AND SECONDARY MARKET SECURITIES FRAUD
CLASS ACTIONS
Congress did not create a general private cause of action for fraud
when it enacted the Securities Exchange Act in 1934. Instead, it opted
to create narrow causes of action for specific types of misconduct,
12
such as market manipulation. Congress did, however, authorize the
SEC to adopt antifraud rules that the agency could then enforce. The
SEC exercised that rulemaking authority in 1940 when it adopted
13
Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5, like § 10(b), the statutory provision that
authorizes it, says nothing about a private cause of action. The courts,
however, have not been deterred by that void and have implied a
sweeping cause of action under Rule 10b-5. In the absence of a
statutory directive, courts have relied heavily on the requirements of
the common law action for deceit (the typical cause of action for
fraud) in fleshing out the details of that implied Rule 10b-5 cause of
14
action. At common law, plaintiffs were required to allege that they
had relied on a fraudulent misstatement and that it induced them to
make the purchase. So for a fraud claim involving a company’s
common stock, an investor-plaintiff would have to show that they
read the misstatements that allegedly distorted the price of a

12. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i (West 2015).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2015).
14. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 341, 361 (2005) (stating that a private right of
action under § 10(b) “resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit and
misrepresentation”).
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company’s stock before they purchased (or sold). The problem,
however, is that for companies whose shares are publicly traded,
many (perhaps most) of the investors buying and selling the
company’s shares will not have read the misstatement, or even been
aware of it. Consequently, they will not be able to claim reliance in the
traditional sense. Thus, the reliance requirement posed a substantial
obstacle to bringing a case involving secondary market fraud under
Rule 10b-5.
The problem is particularly acute for class actions. If all plaintiffs
were required to allege, individually, that they had read and relied
upon the misstatement in making their decision to purchase or sell, a
class could not be certified because it would have too many factual
questions that were not common to the class (a prerequisite to class
15
certification). Moreover, individual investors would rarely have
sufficient losses to justify the expense of bringing suit on their own,
even if they could satisfy the reliance requirement.
To overcome this obstacle to class certification, the Supreme
Court effectively gutted the reliance requirement for most claims of
secondary market fraud, albeit in a surreptitious way. The gutting took
two steps, both choreographed by Justice Harry Blackmun. Justice
Blackmun first excused the reliance requirement for fraudulent
omissions with his opinion for the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of
16
Utah v. United States. The gravamen of the fraud in Affiliated Ute was
deceptive non-disclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty. This first step
in Affiliated Ute was understandable and perhaps inevitable. In the
case of non-disclosure, it was impossible for the plaintiffs to plead
actual reliance because the violation was a failure to speak, rather
than a misstatement. In such a situation, the Court concluded that
materiality of the omission would “establish the requisite element of
causation in fact.” The holding was unsurprising in that context—how
can you rely on something left unsaid?—but Justice Blackmun’s
approach would lead to mischief going forward. In Affiliated Ute, the
Court treated reliance simply as a species of the tort concept of
proximate causation: Is the defendant’s conduct sufficiently close to

15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (A class action is maintainable if “the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting individual class members.”).
16. 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (excusing reliance in case involving fraudulent non-disclosure by a
fiduciary).
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the harm to the plaintiff? Framed this way, the question seems
deceptively easy, Torts 101 as it were.
The complexity of the reliance issue became more apparent,
however, when the Court returned to the issue fifteen years later. The
logic of Affiliated Ute’s presumption of reliance did not cover
affirmative misstatements, so the obstacle that reliance creates for
class certification remained in those cases. The Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, urged on by the SEC, and with Justice Blackmun again
writing for the majority, effectively completed the dismantling of the
reliance requirement by adopting the “fraud-on-the-market”
presumption of reliance. The FOTM presumption allows plaintiffs to
skip the step of alleging personal reliance on the misstatement,
instead allowing them to allege that the market relied on the
misrepresentation in valuing the security, and that, in turn, they relied
on a market price that was distorted by the deception. The economic
premise underlying the FOTM presumption is the efficient capital
market hypothesis, which holds that markets rapidly incorporate
information—true or false—into the market price of a security. Thus,
the price paid by the plaintiffs would have been inflated by the fraud,
establishing a causal connection between the fraud and the purchase.
For Justice Blackmun, the economic analysis was painfully obvious:
17
“Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”
Justice Byron White, dissenting in Basic, worried the economics
were more complicated: “[T]he Court, I fear, embarks on a course
that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to consequences it
18
cannot foresee.” Presciently, Justice White noted that adopting the
appropriate measure of damages was critical to the implementation of
the Court’s new FOTM regime. Justice White also noted, however,
that Justice Blackmun and the Court’s majority had ducked that
19
question. What neither Justice White nor Justice Blackmun could
have anticipated, however, is that the Court would fail to address the
critical question of damages for the twenty-five plus years after
handing down Basic. The economic waste that followed the adoption
of the FOTM presumption could have been mitigated if the Court
had adopted a measure of damages appropriate to the FOTM

17. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys.
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
18. Id. at 254 (White, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 254 n.5.
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reliance regime. We are still waiting for the Supreme Court to address
this question.
III. DAMAGES
Why did the Court pass on the critical question of damages? The
easy answer is that it was not presented in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
which was before the Court on a motion to dismiss (damages issues
would typically not be reached by an appellate court until after a jury
verdict). At least one justice (John Paul Stevens), however, recognized
that the damages question was a challenging one; Justice Stevens
asked Justice Blackmun to note in the Court’s opinion that the Court
20
was not resolving it. This is perhaps fortunate, as Justice Blackmun
might well have made things worse. The available evidence suggests
he was focused solely on compensation; there is no evidence that he
even considered disgorgement, the typical remedy provided for in the
21
explicit causes of action in the federal securities laws.
The elements of reliance and damages are not so easily severed. In
adopting the fraud-on-the-market presumption, Justice Blackmun saw
himself as merely following his earlier opinion in Affiliated Ute
22
Citizens of Utah v. United States; which Justice Blackmun
characterized as holding that reliance was satisfied as long as “the
necessary nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s
23
wrongful conduct had been established.” In Affiliated Ute, the
connection between reliance and damages was self-evident. The
fraudulent transaction at issue fit neatly into the tort action for deceit.
The plaintiffs’ losses corresponded to the defendants’ gains; the
defendants had withheld material information about the value of the
securities that they were purchasing from the plaintiffs. The ordinary
“out-of-pocket” measure of tort damages—the difference between
the price paid to (or by) the victim and the security’s “true” value—
20. Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes, Basic v. Levinson, No. 86-279 (Nov. 4, 1987)
(Harry A. Blackmun Collection, Library of Congress).
21. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to William J. Brennan, Jr., No. 86-279, Basic v.
Levinson (Jan. 15, 1988) (Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress) (“[T]here are at
least two theories of damages that a plaintiff could propose, and this opinion does not lend
particular support to either. . . . [T]he plaintiff could argue that he would not have sold had he
known about the merger discussion, and thus that he should receive the difference between the
price at which he sold ($18) and the eventual merger price ($42). Alternatively, one could argue
that a plaintiff should recover the difference between the price he sold ($18) and what the price
would have been had defendants not misrepresented the facts ($20).”).
22. 406 U.S. 128, 156 (1972).
23. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
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fits in this context. In this scenario, requiring that the defendant
compensate the plaintiff for her losses corrects the distortions caused
by fraud in two ways. First, requiring compensation to the victim
discourages the defendant from committing fraud: no upside. Second,
compensation discourages investors from spending resources trying to
avoid the consequences of fraud.
Expenditures on committing and avoiding fraud are the real social
costs that the anti-fraud cause of action is trying to prevent. The
wealth transfer from the victim to the defendant is relevant only
insofar as it induces those expenditures. That policy goal is clear; more
subtle is the connection between those costs and the reliance element
24
of the tort action for deceit. Expenditures by both the perpetrator
and the victim due to fraud are a social waste, so discouraging those
expenditures by requiring compensation makes sense when the
defendant is benefiting from the fraud. Fraud may influence how
investors direct their capital. Firms selling securities in the primary
market disclose more information in an effort to attract investors. If
those disclosures are fraudulent, investors will pay an inflated price
for those securities and companies will invest in projects that are not
cost-justified. That risk of fraud will lead investors to discount the
value of securities generally, thus raising the cost of capital for
publicly traded firms. The upshot is that fraud should be punished
when the defendant benefits from the securities transaction affected
by fraud. Requiring a defendant to compensate a victim ensures that
fraud does not pay. Compensation and deterrence are neatly aligned.
Basic’s FOTM presumption, however, does not require that the
defendant have purchased or sold the security whose price was
allegedly affected by the misstatement. In fact, in the overwhelming
majority of securities fraud class actions, plaintiffs’ attorneys sue the
corporation and its officers for misrepresenting the company’s
operations, financial performance, or future prospects that inflate the
price of the company’s stock in secondary trading markets. Because
the corporation has not sold securities in that market (and thereby
transferred wealth to itself), it has no institutional incentive to spend
real resources in executing the fraud—and thus no reason to

24. Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78
VA. L. REV. 623, 630 (1992) (“If fraud is not deterred, market participants will take expensive
precautions to uncover fraud so as to avoid entering into bargains they would not have
concluded in an honest market.”).
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encourage the investor reliance that the FOTM presumption seeks to
promote.
On the investor side of the equation, secondary market fraud does
not create a net wealth transfer away from investors, at least in the
aggregate. For every shareholder who bought at a fraudulently
inflated price, another shareholder has sold: The buyer’s individual
25
loss is offset by the seller’s gain. Assuming all traders are ignorant of
the fraud, they can expect to win as often as they lose from
26
fraudulently distorted prices. With no expected loss from fraud on
the market, shareholders have little incentive to take precautions
against the fraud. Thus, secondary-market fraud fits awkwardly in the
confines of the tort action for deceit, which so neatly fits
misrepresentations in face-to-face transactions. In face-to-face
transactions, parties naturally take precautions to manage the risk of
fraud (verification), so deterring fraud in those transactions deters
expenditures on precautions, the real social cost engendered by fraud.
Oddly enough, the status of many shareholders as passive price
takers in the secondary market was one of the rationales offered by
the Basic Court for adopting the FOTM presumption. The Basic
Court has it exactly backwards: Because these shareholders are
passive, they are not relying in the economically relevant sense, which
is to say, they are not making a choice to forego verification and
instead rely on statements. Verification is not an option for the passive
investor (the intended beneficiary of the FOTM presumption);
checking the accuracy of a corporation’s statements is a task that can
be only undertaken by an investment professional, and even these
sophisticated actors will uncover fraud only rarely (and profit
handsomely when they do, suggesting that it may not be essential to
compensate them when they do not). Passive investors can protect
themselves against fraud much more cheaply through diversification.
Fraud, like other business reversals, is a firm-specific risk, so
assembling a broad portfolio of companies essentially eliminates its
effect on an investor’s portfolio. The losses from the few bad apples
will be offset by the (discounted) gains from the honest companies.

25. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607, 611 (1985).
26. Alicia Davis Evans, Are Investors’ Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal Over
Time? Some Preliminary Evidence (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers,
Paper No. 13, Oct. 25, 2010) (demonstrating that diversified traders’ gains and losses from
securities fraud average out to essentially zero).
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The irony of the FOTM presumption, intended to protect passive
investors, is that the ultimate passive investors—holders of index
funds—have already protected themselves against fraud in the
secondary market, and at a very low cost.
Notwithstanding the ability of shareholders to protect themselves
through diversification, the FOTM presumption, when coupled with
the “out-of-pocket” tort measure of damages, puts the corporation on
the hook to compensate investors who come out on the losing end of
27
a trade at a price distorted by misrepresentation. The current rule
holds corporations responsible for the entire loss of all of the
shareholders who paid too much for their shares as a result of
fraudulent misrepresentations attributed to the corporation. Critically,
the “out-of-pocket” measure of damages provides no offset for the
windfall gain on the other side of the trade. The investors lucky
enough to have been selling during the period of the fraud do not
have to give their profits back (they did not commit fraud). Given the
trading volume in secondary markets, the potential recoverable
damages in securities class actions can be a substantial percentage of
the corporation’s total capitalization, easily reaching hundreds of
millions of dollars, and sometimes billions, for companies whose stock
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq. With
potential damages in this range, class actions are a big stick to wield
against fraud. More importantly, the “out-of-pocket” measure
exaggerates the social harm caused by FOTM because it fails to
account for the windfall gains of equally innocent shareholders who
sold at the inflated price. Absent insider trading (for which there are
other remedies), the losses and gains will be a wash for shareholders
in the aggregate, even though some individual shareholders will have
suffered substantial losses.
That seems wasteful, but the waste becomes more salient in light
of the fact that no real compensatory purpose is served by securities
fraud class actions. Despite the enormous sums being spent on
litigation, shareholders typically get pennies on the dollar for their
losses. Worse yet, the settlements are paid from either corporate
coffers or directors’ and officers’ insurance (for which the premia
were paid by the corporation). The net result is that settlements are
being paid at the expense of former and current shareholders.

27. See Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under
Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177 (1996) (discussing damages under Rule 10b-5).
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Shareholders as a class are undeniably net losers from this circular
exercise, as lawyers (and experts) take home the real money in
exchange for their efforts in keeping the securities fraud class action
industrial complex running.
Are these gigantic expenditures on lawyers deterring corporate
fraud? We don’t really know. Sorting cases of actual fraud from mere
business reverses is a difficult task—fact intensive and requiring
subtle judgments. It should be no surprise that a system charged with
that task is expensive. If securities class actions succeed in accurately
sorting fraud from non-fraud, it might well justify the enormous sums
spent on lawyers. But if lawyers are paid billions without reducing the
probability or magnitude of corporate fraud, then from a social
welfare perspective these payments to lawyers are a deadweight loss.
Making sensible policy choices about securities fraud class actions
necessitates grappling with that question. But there is no evidence
that judges—and in particular the justices who sit on the Supreme
Court—are up to that task, notwithstanding their willingness to
conduct a high stakes policy experiment with securities fraud class
actions.
IV. THE DELUGE AND THE RESPONSE
The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance was intended to
facilitate securities fraud class actions. Measured by this criterion,
Basic was a tremendous success. The number of securities fraud class
actions increased dramatically after Basic Inc. v. Levinson validated
the FOTM presumption.
Although the FOTM presumption ensures that private plaintiffs
would have incentives to sue, the out-of-pocket measure of damages
assumed by lower courts means that the incentives to sue were
excessive. The FOTM presumption generates too many suits because
defendants’ incentive to settle these cases has only a tenuous
connection with the merits: even a small prospect of losing at trial
puts a big thumb on the scale toward settlement, even if the company
has done nothing wrong. The math is simple: a one percent chance of
losing a $2 billion judgment makes it economically rational to cut a
check for $20 million, even ignoring the massive costs of mounting a
28
defense. Even supremely confident defendants will settle meritless
28. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1511 (1996) (“The class-based compensatory damages regime in theory
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cases rather than risk the very real possibility of a jury verdict that
threatens bankruptcy. Such settlements are wasteful; investors do not
benefit when companies pay settlements that have little to do with the
merits of the case. Unless settlements are targeting fraud with a high
degree of accuracy, securities class actions are little more than a costly
form of insurance against business reverses. Investors ultimately foot
the bill while lawyers profit.
Even in cases of actual fraud, the FOTM regime raises a lot of
questions. To start, consider that any lies were told not by “the
company”—an artificial legal construct—but by executives who spoke
29
on its behalf. These officers may have benefitted from these lies
(along with any shareholders who sold shares after the lie but before
the fraud was revealed), but these officers do not pay damages to
compensate those who bought after the lies and held their shares. The
company pays those losing investors, which effectively means current
30
shareholders (who did not profit from the lies) pay for them. This
transfer of wealth, from innocent current shareholders to former
shareholders—with a big chunk going to lawyers—serves no obvious
retributive purpose. And with wrongdoing managers typically not
paying any portion of the damages, the case for deterrence is shaky at
best.
What are the consequences of the Supreme Court’s policy
experiment? The incentives unleashed by Basic spawned a flood of
securities fraud suits, often targeting start-up firms with high volatility,
regardless of connection to actual fraud. When the stock prices of
these firms fell, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed suits, and then combed
disclosures for potential misstatements. Settlements followed quickly,
however, obviating any need to prove fraud. The upshot was a tax on
risk, which raised the cost of capital for start-up firms.
In response, Republicans made securities class action reform a
centerpiece of their Contract with America in 1994. When the
Republicans took control of Congress that year, they passed the
imposes remedies that are so catastrophically large that defendants are unwilling to go to trial
even if they believe the chance of being found liable is small.”).
29. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691.
30. See id. at 719 (“Although compensating victims may be a laudable goal, enterprise
liability does not serve the goal of just compensation because it simply replaces one group of
innocent victims with another: those who were shareholders when the fraud was revealed.
Moreover, enterprise liability does not even effect a one-to-one transfer between innocent
victims: a large percentage of the plaintiffs’ recovery goes to their lawyers.”).
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), with the
substantial Democratic support necessary to override President
31
William Clinton’s veto of the bill. The PSLRA made a number of
reforms intended to reduce the extortionate threat of securities class
actions. Most notably, it raised the standards for pleading fraud,
delayed discovery until after a hearing on a motion to dismiss, and
changed the selection of lead counsel from a race to the courthouse to
a presumption in favor of the attorney chosen by the shareholder32
plaintiff with the largest economic stake in the outcome. The effect
of these restrictions has been to force plaintiffs to focus on objective
evidence, such as restatements, insider trading, and SEC enforcement
33
actions, as the basis for bringing suit. This means that securities class
actions are now brought when the indicia of fraud are relatively
obvious, so they serve no purpose in uncovering fraud. And not
surprisingly, cases continue to be brought when the damages
calculation is greatest, with large stock price drops and heavy
34
trading. This means that post-PSLRA, the companies punished
hardest by the market are also the ones that are most likely to face a
class action. If securities class actions are a “necessary supplement” to
35
SEC enforcement, Congress’s reforms in the PSLRA have ensured
that the supplement is directed where it is least needed.
This failure is the result of Congress not dealing with the
underlying drivers of these suits: the FOTM presumption and the
incoherent measure of damages. The House of Representatives
36
considered eliminating the FOTM presumption, but the SEC
37
opposed the provision and it was abandoned in favor of a
codification of FOTM which would have set forth more clearly when

31. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in part at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4
(West 2015)).
32. For a discussion of these provisions, see Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson, & A.C.
Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007).
33. Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson, & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 35 (2009).
34. Johnson et al., supra note 31, at 641, Table 4.
35. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985).
36. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995). A comprehensive account of the legislative history of the
PSLRA can be found in John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996).
37. Testimony of Chairman Arthur Levitt Concerning Litigation Reform Proposals Before
the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Commerce, Feb.
10, 1995, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt.
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38

the presumption would apply. By the time the bill came out of
conference, this codification of the FOTM presumption also had been
39
abandoned. The result was stalemate on the FOTM presumption.
Why did Congress back away from undoing Basic’s FOTM
presumption? One answer is that the original House bill offered
nothing in its place. Requiring plaintiffs to plead actual reliance
eliminates class actions for frauds affecting secondary markets,
leaving fraud deterrence exclusively in the hands of the SEC and the
Justice Department. Another reason may be that eliminating
compensation is a political non-starter. The “pocket shifting” element
of secondary-market class actions has been well known for a long
time, but it does not seem to have influenced legislative thinking.
Congress’s contribution on the subject of compensation came in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which includes a “Fair Funds” provision
allowing the SEC to use recoveries from its enforcement actions to
40
compensate investors. This provision of compensation is perverse
from a policy perspective, as compensating defrauded investors takes
some of the sting out of putting all of their eggs in one basket—not
exactly a shrewd investment strategy. As noted above, widows and
orphans can better protect themselves against the risk of fraud
through portfolio diversification (and at far less cost). The Fair Funds
provision is evidence that providing compensation to widows and
orphans sells well on the campaign trail, even if the expenditures on
compensation are largely a social waste.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court heard several big cases with
Basic’s FOTM presumption lurking in the background. Its restrictive
decisions suggest that the Court viewed the system—one that it had
created—as fundamentally broken. In Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver the Court held that there was no aiding and
41
abetting liability for private securities fraud suits. The Court
extended this ruling to cover alleged schemes to defraud in Stoneridge
42
Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta and in Janus Capital Group,
43
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, which limits liability to the legal entity
that actually makes a misstatement. In another series of cases, the
38. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 2 (1995).
39. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7246(a) (West 2015).
41. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
42. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
43. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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Court narrowly interpreted the concept of causation. In Dura
44
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Court held that it was not
enough for plaintiffs to show they bought shares at prices inflated by
lies; they also had to show that the revelation of the lies caused the
stock price to drop. The cases, which repeatedly erected incremental
barriers to plaintiffs bringing securities class actions, make sense only
if the justices perceive securities fraud class actions as a highly
dysfunctional system for deterring corporate fraud. That dysfunction
is apparent to even casual observers, but incremental reform is not
going to fix it. The grossly distorted measure of damages lurks in the
background.
Moreover, the Court’s cases did not go all in one direction.
Although one could reasonably view this series of cases as the
Supreme Court’s attempt to tame the beast it unleashed upon the
corporate world, in more recent cases the Court balked at killing the
beast altogether, or even substantially weakening it. In Tellabs Inc. v.
45
Makor Issues & Rights the Court interpreted the PSLRA’s pleading
standard to require that plaintiffs show that the inference of a
fraudulent intent was as strong as any innocent explanation, the least
stringent interpretation the language of the statute could plausibly
46
support. In Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton (Halliburton I) the
Court refused to extend the Dura rule to the class certification
stage—it held that plaintiffs do not have to show loss causation at the
class certification stage to invoke the FOTM presumption. Similarly,
47
in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds the
Court held that plaintiffs are not required to prove alleged
misstatements were material (that is, something a reasonable investor
would care about when making an investment decision) at the class
action certification stage. Instead, the plaintiff would only be required
to prove materiality at trial. The Court refused to fashion special rules
for certifying securities class actions, notwithstanding its apparently
skeptical view of the merits of many of these claims. Or perhaps the
Court saw the PSLRA’s pleading standard as reducing the incidence
of frivolous suits to an acceptable level.
This pattern of cases seems to mirror the stalemate in Congress;
tinkering around the edges with incremental reform, but no real
44.
45.
46.
47.

544 U.S. 336 (2005).
551 U.S. 308 (2007).
131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
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appetite for tackling the fundamental flaw. Against this background, it
came as a surprise in Amgen when four justices—Scalia, Thomas,
48
Kennedy, and Alito—urged the Court to reconsider Basic altogether.
Their signal suggested a heretofore unrevealed willingness to consider
reform of the Court’s FOTM policy experiment. The opportunity
presented itself when the Court’s remand in Halliburton I came back
for consideration in Halliburton II.
V. HALLIBURTON II
The defendants in Halliburton II argued that Basic Inc. v. Levison
should be overruled and that plaintiffs should have to show they
49
relied on alleged misstatements. Given the constraints of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such a decision would have
made securities fraud class actions effectively impossible, undoing the
deluge unleashed by Basic. Moreover, private enforcement under §
10(b) would have been substantially reduced, likely left to
institutional investors to bring some form of “mass action,”
constrained by the need for each investor to prove reliance.
Corporate fraud would not have been left entirely unchecked, since
there would still be the threat of government enforcement, state law
claims, and a variety of other potential federal law claims for private
plaintiffs to pursue. But it would certainly have been a bold judicial
stroke, and one that might have finally provoked Congress to act.
Halliburton’s argument for overruling Basic was premised on
empirical research raising doubts about the efficient capital market
hypothesis, which was the basis of the Basic Court’s conclusion that
plaintiffs can rely on the market to quickly incorporate all
information (true or false) into stock prices. Tackling that question
would require the justices to digest a good deal of sophisticated
financial economics. The Court’s track record hardly suggests that the
justices are ready for that learning experience. Chief Justice Roberts
fretted at the Halliburton II oral argument that the justices were not
well positioned to evaluate the financial economics: “How am I
supposed to review the economic literature and decide which [side in
50
this case] is correct . . . ?” Chief Justice Roberts’s question implicitly
suggested that overturning Basic would be an uphill battle, not on the
48. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito,
J., concurring); Amgen, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. Brief of Petitioners, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317).
50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317).
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merits, but instead, simply because of judicial incapacity to assess the
relative strength of the arguments presented.
A glimmer of hope arose at the oral argument, however, when
Justice Kennedy asked Halliburton’s lawyer to “address the position
taken by the law professors, I call it the midway position, that says
51
there should be an event study.” The “law professors” were myself
and Todd Henderson of the University of Chicago. We filed an amicus
brief in which we argued that instead of scrapping Basic’s FOTM
presumption altogether, the Court should instead require plaintiffs to
52
show “price impact” in order to certify a class. Price impact means
the alleged misrepresentations caused the stock price to rise or stay
steady when it otherwise would have fallen. Our proposal would have
reformed, rather than scrapped, FOTM class actions. This argument
went to the second question presented in Halliburton II: “Whether, in
a case where the plaintiff invokes a presumption of reliance to seek
class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and
prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the
misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock.”
Our proposal introduced a twist on that question by urging that
plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at the class certification stage to
show price impact. The policy goal underlying our proposal was to
eliminate debates about the efficiency of markets, which are
irrelevant to the question of whether fraud occurred. Requiring
plaintiffs (or, rather, the plaintiffs’ lawyers) to show price impact
would discourage them from bringing weak cases for their settlement
value. We argued that disputes over market efficiency were dragging
district courts into costly and uncertain territory which those judges
were ill-equipped to manage. The strongest argument, however, is that
the market efficiency requirement biases suits towards firms trading
in obviously efficient markets (like the NYSE) instead of arguably
less efficient ones (like the OTC Pink Sheets). This is perverse
because the probability of fraud is considerably lower for publicly
traded firms on the large exchanges relative to more thinly traded
over-the-counter stocks. Companies whose securities trade in
“inefficient” markets—e.g., smaller companies trading in the over-thecounter market and debt issuers—are essentially immune to securities
class actions, even though these issuers are more likely to commit

51. Id. at 17.
52. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 9.
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fraud because they generally lack the elaborate internal controls and
Big Four auditors employed by the largest companies. The FOTM
presumption targets anti-fraud enforcement where it is least needed.
That is a fairly sophisticated theory, with a lot of moving parts.
Much of it is probably difficult to grasp for someone not immersed in
the field of securities fraud class actions. Our strategic assessment,
however, was that reform of the FOTM presumption was more likely
than its abandonment, and this reform would be simple enough for
the justices to grab onto if they were looking for a fix. And a
compromise solution might have particular appeal for justices who
are struggling to understand the relevant economic theories.
As oral argument unfolded, it seemed our strategic calculation
might pay off. Justice Kennedy raised the possibility of “the law
professors’ theory of an event study at the certification stage” with
53
counsel for the class, who struggled to come up with a rejoinder.
Justice Scalia seemed to be jumping on the bandwagon when he
inquired whether the PSLRA would be compatible with a price
54
impact requirement, or as he termed it “Basic writ small.” The
seeming clincher came when Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm
Stewart, arguing as amicus on behalf of the government and the SEC,
responded to a question from Justice Elena Kagan. She asked Stewart
to address the impact “on individual decision-making with respect to
55
securities . . . if the law professors’ position was adopted.” After some
meandering, Justice Kennedy nudged Stewart back to Justice Kagan’s
56
question. Stewart’s response: “I don’t think that the consequences
would be nearly so dramatic [as overturning Basic]. In fact if anything,
that would be a net gain to plaintiffs, because plaintiffs already have
57
to prove price impact at the end of the day.”
Most tealeaf readers (myself included) thought that Stewart’s
response was the pivotal moment of the oral argument. It appeared
that the lawyer for the SEC had conceded that requiring a showing of
price impact would not be a big deal. Indeed, Stewart (erroneously)
58
suggested that it might make plaintiffs better off. For justices looking
53. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–34, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13317).
54. Id. at 40–41.
55. Id. at 47–48.
56. Id. at 49.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Stewart was wrong because his answer ignores the reality that securities class actions
always settle if they are not dismissed, so the lawsuits never get to “the end of the day.”
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for an “intermediate position” that would bring reform without
unduly disrupting existing practice—a conservative ideal straight out
of Edmund Burke’s playbook—the advocate for the principal
regulator of the securities markets told them that they had found it.
59
Reform, though modest, had won!
Not so fast. When the Halliburton II opinion was handed down a
few months later, the Court rejected our price impact argument,
instead preserving the requirement that plaintiffs show market
efficiency to invoke the FOTM presumption. Rather perplexingly,
however, the Court did allow defendants to prove there was no price
impact from the alleged misrepresentation. From a policy perspective,
this move seems like a clear mistake. The Halliburton II decision does
nothing to discourage plaintiffs’ lawyers from going after the deepest
pockets—they are still incentivized to target firms that trade in more
efficient markets. But the decision adds a new battle of the experts—
without jettisoning the old one—that will further increase the already
enormous cost of litigating these cases.
Halliburton II’s price impact defense will encourage defendants to
put on economists to testify that the alleged misstatements did not
affect the market price. Plaintiffs will respond with their own
economists who will testify that it did. Trial judges will be charged
with sorting out the mess. Markets vary in the speed with which they
incorporate information. Moreover, the significance of the
information matters as well, so it can be a challenging task to establish
whether a statement affected the market price. That challenge can be
particularly daunting if a company releases multiple pieces of
information at the same time or if corrective disclosure reaches the
market in dribs and drabs. With the burden of proof on defendants,
many trial judges, faced with conflicting economic evidence that they
are scarcely equipped to evaluate, will opt to certify a class. The most
that defendants can realistically hope to achieve is that the price
impact inquiry will limit some unduly expansive class periods.
Consequently, the watered-down role for price impact evidence
adopted by the Court in Halliburton II is likely to have minimal realworld effect on the mix of cases pursued by plaintiffs. Despite the
limited prospects for success and the added litigation expense, it will
be the rare defendant that does not take advantage of the opportunity

59. Adam Liptak, Justices May Limit Securities Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/business/justices-may-limit-securities-fraud-suits.html?_r=0.
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afforded by the Halliburton II decision. Insurers will raise premia
paid by companies for directors’ and officers’ insurance to
compensate for the additional expert fees. Recall that those premia
are ultimately born by shareholders.
Why did the Court make a legal move that was such an obvious
policy mistake? The Court fell back on stare decisis—it was reluctant
to overturn (or even reform) a decades-old precedent that had
become such a central feature of modern securities fraud litigation.
The Court took its timid approach because to do otherwise would
require it to choose sides in a dispute about financial economics for
which it was poorly equipped. Chief Justice Roberts is certainly
correct that issues of financial economics relevant to price impact are
beyond the ken of most judges. Unfortunately, the Basic FOTM
presumption, which the Court preserved in Halliburton II, requires
trial judges to make similarly fraught economic decisions in
determining market efficiency in every securities fraud class action.
By choosing to retain the FOTM presumption, the Court did choose a
side, or rather, chose to stick with the side it had previously chosen in
Basic. The side it chose pushes in the direction of excessive amounts
of litigation, targeting the wrong actors, and yielding dubious
deterrence of fraud. Worse yet, the Court added a price impact
defense that requires trial judges to tackle a second set of challenging
economic questions, on top of the existing inquiry into market
efficiency. Those inquiries have nothing to do with whether or not
fraud occurred.
Why throw trial court judges into that briar patch? Counting the
votes in the majority, Justice Kennedy’s vote with the majority’s timid
approach is the most puzzling. His questions at oral argument
suggested that he was open to reforming the FOTM presumption, but
perhaps he was simply committed to finding a compromise that
appeared to be “doing something.” Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
makes clear that he was looking for any changes to be at least
colorably consistent with Basic, so that he could not be accused of
60
overruling prior precedent. And one can presume that Justice
Ginsburg and the other concurring justices would have preferred the
status quo but were willing to cede some ground if it meant
61
forestalling dramatic change. What we do not know is whether the
60. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415–16 (arguing that a “price impact” defense
is consistent with Basic).
61. Id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Court’s judgment . . . should impose no
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dissenting justices attempted to bargain with Justice Kennedy (as
Justice Scalia’s comments at oral argument about “Basic writ small”
suggested they might be willing to do), or whether they were
committed to overruling Basic altogether. The answer to that question
will wait for a future history, after the current justices’ internal papers
are released.
What we do know from the published opinion in Halliburton II is
that the Court expects Congress to make substantive reform to
securities class actions, despite the fact that the Court created the
62
current securities class action regime out of whole cloth. Of course,
the Court could have overruled Basic, and given Congress the same
invitation to create an explicit private right of action in the statute.
This is effectively what happened in the wake of Central Bank of
Denver—Congress responded by adding a public right of action for
aiding and abetting in § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. But
Congress is unlikely to take the Court up on its invitation to reform
securities fraud class actions, given that it ducked fundamental reform
the last time it entered the fray.
VI. WHO CAN FIX THIS MESS?
With its decision in Halliburton II, the Supreme Court has made it
painfully clear that it is not going to reform securities class actions.
Although judicial modesty may be a virtue, it is an odd response when
the Court’s policy experiment made the mess in the first instance.
Moreover, the Court’s deference to Congress seems misplaced when
the politicians have demonstrated that they have no appetite for
reform. And why should they? The legislature didn’t make this mess.
The Court’s commitment to stare decisis also likely carries little
weight with the shareholders who (involuntarily) foot the multibillion dollar bill for the Court’s ill-considered experiment in fraud
deterrence policy. Indeed, the Court’s continued tinkering around the
edges of securities class actions has made a bad situation worse,
raising the implicit fraud-on-the-market tax on public corporations.
Halliburton II just raises the levy.
The fact of the matter is that the Court simply lacks the requisite
institutional expertise for reform, even if it had the appetite. The
heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.”).
62. See id. at 2411 (majority opinion) (“As with any other element of that cause of action,
Congress may overturn or modify any aspect of our interpretations of the reliance requirement,
including the Basic presumption itself.”).
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members of the Court are all former government officials, academics,
appellate advocates, etc. They are all highly talented lawyers, but
simply put, they are not equipped to confront the highly technical
field of securities law, which cannot be separated from financial
economics. It has been almost 30 years since the last justice with
substantial experience as a corporate lawyer—Lewis F. Powell, Jr.—
63
retired from the Court. (The Basic Inc. v. Levinson fiasco
immediately followed his departure.) The current Court has made it
clear that it prefers to leave the field to Congress. Halliburton II
suggests that the Court’s deference may come, in part, from the
realization that the justices are not up to the task of reforming
securities class actions. That task requires both an economist’s
expertise in financial markets and an institutional understanding of
how securities class actions work. The intersection of those skill sets is
a rare enough commodity; expecting it to show up on the Supreme
Court is wholly unrealistic.
Perhaps reform could come from Congress? Not likely. As noted
above, Congress punted on the question of the FOTM presumption
when it adopted the PSLRA in 1995. Why? The political reality was
that two powerful constituencies were diametrically opposed. For the
plaintiffs’ bar, the FOTM presumption was the foundation of their
(lucrative) livelihood. Repealing it would be an existential threat and
they responded with political resources commensurate to that threat.
On the other side of the battle was corporate America, particularly
the high tech sector, wailing that lawsuits were chilling growth and
destroying jobs. Neither side had the political clout to declare outright
victory—the result was a stalemate. Congress tightened the screws on
securities class actions, but left FOTM suits largely alone. With big
donors on both sides, the FOTM presumption was simply too
politically hot to handle and the status quo prevailed. Nothing has
changed to alter that political calculus in the last twenty years.
Perhaps the SEC, an independent agency, could rise above the
political fray? Its opposition to reform during the legislative process
leading up to the PSLRA is hardly promising, and the SEC’s
subsequent positions are no more encouraging. The SEC consistently
sides with the plaintiffs’ bar in its amicus role, as it did in Halliburton
II. The SEC’s support for the plaintiffs’ bar in part reflects its own

63. On Powell’s influence, see A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the
Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003).
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institutional interests because the agency favors broad interpretations
64
of its governing statutes. The SEC’s commitment to the plaintiffs’ bar
goes beyond that interest, however, as it sides with the plaintiffs’ bar
even on issues that relate purely to the terms of the implied Rule 10b5 cause of action, like the price impact issue in Halliburton II. Those
issues have no effect on the SEC’s enforcement agenda; the SEC does
65
not have to prove reliance in its enforcement cases. The SEC’s longstanding commitment to the plaintiffs’ bar can only be ascribed to
ideology, as the agency staff views its investor protection role broadly.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are viewed (perhaps simplistically) as allies in that
66
fight. The SEC has the authority to reform Rule 10b-5 class actions,
but given the agency’s track record, it is unrealistic to expect reform
to come from that quarter.
Who’s left? Perhaps shareholders will take matters into their own
hands. Shareholders have the right incentives for evaluating reforms
because they are forced to internalize both the benefits and costs of
securities class actions. Shareholders benefit from securities class
actions if those suits generate deterrence. Deterrence promotes
accurate share prices and thereby reduces the cost of participation in
the securities markets. These benefits flow to corporations as well
because they translate into a lower cost of capital. Shareholders (at
least some of them) are also the beneficiaries of the compensation
paid out in securities class actions, modest though it may be. On the
other side of the equation, shareholders (all of them this time) also
ultimately bear the costs of securities fraud class actions, including the
payment of attorneys’ fees on both sides of the litigation, the cost of
experts (ramped up by Halliburton II), and the distraction costs to
executives arising from defending the lawsuit. Directors’s and
officers’s insurance will cover most of the direct costs, but the premia
for that insurance are ultimately paid by the shareholders. Less
tangible, but perhaps larger, are costs firms incur to avoid being sued:
more money spent on lawyers’ fees for flyspecking disclosure
documents, higher auditors’ fees, and less forthcoming disclosure.

64. See, e.g, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197–99 (1976) (rejecting the SEC
argument—advanced as amicus in a private suit—for a negligence standard in Rule 10b-5
actions).
65. Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The SEC is not required to
prove reliance or injury in enforcement actions.”); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549–51
(3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the government need not prove reliance in criminal cases).
66. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994).
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These costs are not covered by insurance. How does the balance tip
between the benefits of deterrence and its costs? Perhaps
shareholders should be allowed to weigh for themselves.
The most sensible option would be to allow shareholders to
change the damage measure in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class
67
actions involving the company, its officers, and directors. Instead of
compensation, which is theoretically dubious and rarely achieved in
practice, shareholders might want to focus on deterrence. Specifically,
shareholders could adopt an unjust enrichment model through a
partial waiver of the FOTM presumption of reliance in the
corporation’s articles of incorporation. The waiver would stipulate to
a disgorgement measure of damages, requiring violators to give up the
benefits of the fraud, if the FOTM presumption were invoked in a
securities class action. This partial waiver would not limit shareholderplaintiffs who could plead actual reliance on a misstatement; they
could still seek the standard out-of-pocket measure of damages in
these cases (i.e., compensation would be available to them). Thus, in a
FOTM suit, the company itself would only be liable when making an
offering or repurchasing shares. It would only be liable for out-ofpocket compensation to plaintiffs who actually relied to their
detriment. Deterrence, however, would still be served. Executives who
violated Rule 10b-5 would be liable to repay their compensation tied
to the stock price (bonuses, stock, and options) during the time that
the price was fraudulently manipulated; here the FOTM presumption
could be invoked.
Obviously the damages paid under a disgorgement measure are
unlikely to afford full compensation, but compensation is not the
answer to securities fraud in the secondary market. Investors protect
themselves through diversification; settlements currently only
compensate for a trivial percentage of investor losses. The goal of
securities fraud class actions should be that of unjust enrichment:
deterrence. The purpose of the FOTM version of the Rule 10b-5 cause
of action should be to deprive wrongdoers of the benefits they
obtained by violating Rule 10b-5. Disgorgement is closely tailored to
that goal.

67. I explicate this proposal in greater detail in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
217.
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Can shareholders amend corporate charters to fix this badly
broken system? The staff of the SEC takes the position that such
68
waivers are illegal. Section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act voids
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
thereunder.” Read broadly, § 29 would bar any provision affecting a
right created by the Securities Exchange Act. And written broadly, an
anti-reliance provision could arguably waive compliance with § 10(b)
(although SEC and criminal enforcement would still be available).
The Supreme Court has not addressed waiver of reliance clauses; it
has only interpreted § 29 in connection with mandatory arbitration
clauses. After initially concluding that arbitration provisions
69
conflicted with the anti-waiver provisions in the securities law, the
Court reversed course, concluding that forum selection clauses and
arbitration provisions were enforceable because they did not affect
any “substantive obligations” imposed by the Securities Exchange
70
Act.
The SEC, however, takes the position that the FOTM
presumption is a substantive obligation of the Securities Exchange
Act, despite the fact that it was created by the Supreme Court, not
Congress. Moreover, the Supreme Court has described the FOTM
presumption as “a substantive doctrine of federal securities-fraud
law” in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
71
and in Halliburton II, although the Court has not explained why. So
a waiver of the FOTM presumption—the single reform that would
most closely tie securities fraud class actions to deterrence—may be a
non-starter under current law.
A more blunderbuss response to the problem of securities fraud
class actions would be for shareholders to amend the corporate
charter to require that such disputes be settled in arbitration, without
72
the ability to consolidate individual cases into a class action. A
68. Alaska Air Grp. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 916161 (Mar. 11, 2011).
69. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
70. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987); see also Rodriguez, 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko).
71. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013)).
72. Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual
Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187 (2013); see also Varian
Afshar, Note, A Blended Approach to Reducing the Costs of Shareholder Litigation, 113 MICH.
L. REV. 315 (2014).
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consistent series of decisions from the Supreme Court interpreting
the Federal Arbitration Act strongly supports the enforceability of
73
such a provision. The SEC’s staff of course disagrees, taking the
position that arbitration clauses violate § 29 of the Securities
Exchange Act, notwithstanding the contrary Supreme Court
74
precedent.
Would investors favor such clauses? An arbitration clause is
something of a nuclear option, eliminating both the deterrent value of
securities class actions and the waste they engender. Investors
presumably all favor deterrence, but their interests may diverge on
the availability of compensation, which would be substantially
curtailed under an arbitration regime. The relatively low rate of
participation by retail shareholders in securities class action
settlements suggests that they do not value compensation all that
75
highly. Shareholders who are holders, trading infrequently, are likely
to favor an arbitration regime because they are typically on the
paying end of litigation and settlement in class actions. Investors who
index, whether individual or institutional, are likely to see things the
same way as holders. Indexers have protected themselves against the
firm-specific risk of fraud through diversification; they are unlikely to
favor paying large premiums to lawyers for additional insurance that
they do not need. The votes of institutional investors who actively
pick stocks are harder to handicap. On the one hand, they are more
likely to have been trading during a fraud period, so they are more
likely to be members of a FOTM class. On the other, the proposed
regime would still allow such investors to pursue arbitration, which
might be feasible if they made a large (losing) bet on a stock.
Of course, we will get prompt feedback if investors make the
wrong call in voting to adopt an arbitration clause. If eliminating
FOTM class actions undermines deterrence, we would expect to see a
stock price drop for a firm that requires arbitration of securities
disputes. That will be powerful evidence for opponents of arbitration.
If on the other hand, the stock price response is positive, shareholders
73. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
74. See Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause From I.P.O. Plans N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-ip-o-plans/.
75. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions, 80 WASH U. L.Q. 855 (2002); A.C.
Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002).
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are likely to follow that pioneering firm’s lead in requiring arbitration.
We should at least encourage shareholders to experiment so that we
can get an answer to the question of whether shareholders—those
whom the current system is supposed to benefit—value it as much as
the lawyers and the SEC do.
Even more draconian than arbitration would be a fee-shifting rule.
Corporations might amend their by-laws to adopt a “loser pays”
regime for shareholders bringing suit against the corporation, its
76
officers, and directors. A few of these provisions have already
popped up, and there is reason to believe that the Delaware courts, at
77
least, will uphold them. For those who think that shareholder
litigation has some role to play in keeping officers and directors
78
accountable, this development is likely to be viewed with alarm.
Notably, so far the provisions have been asymmetrical: the
shareholder pays if he loses, but the corporation is not obliged to pay
79
if it loses. This feature is likely to make such provisions difficult to
enforce if challenged, although the in terrorem effect of them may
deter shareholder litigation in the short run.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has struggled for a generation with the wrong
turn it took in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The fraud-on-the-market regime
established in Basic shifts money from one shareholder pocket to
another shareholder pocket at enormous expense. In Halliburton II,
the Court extinguished any hope that it would fix its prior error. The
Court’s institutional commitment to stare decisis—perhaps coupled
with an awareness of its own limitations with the subject matter—
kept it from making any meaningful change. Congress and the SEC
have both had the opportunity to fix the problem created by Basic,
but those institutions are either paralyzed by gridlock (Congress) or
ideologically committed to the status quo (the SEC).

76. Alison Frankel, Sneaky new trend in IPOs: Make shareholders pay if they sue and lose,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2014) http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/10/09/sneaky-new-trend-inipos-make-shareholders-pay-if-they-sue-and-lose/.
77. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
78. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholders, Disarmed by a Delaware Court, N.Y.
TIMES, (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/business/shareholders-disarmed-bya-delaware-court.html.
79. Nithya Narayanan, America’s Tweak To The Loser Pays Rule: A Board-Insulating
Mechanism?, 18 NYSBA N.Y. BUS. L.J. (Winter 2014).

PRITCHARD 08.19.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

HALLIBURTON II: A LOSER’S HISTORY

11/6/2015 3:35 PM

55

Shareholders bear the costs of the FOTM regime, and
shareholders have the power to end those costs by adopting
arbitration or fee-shifting provisions. That “nuclear option” comes at a
cost, however, as it eliminates entirely the deterrent value of securities
class actions. Will shareholders clean up the mess that the Supreme
Court has created with securities class actions? Stay tuned.

